

**Incident Specific Annex 9 – Agriculture Incidents**

**Appendix 8–African Swine Fever**

**Classical Swine Fever**

Authorization & Concurrence

This Plan is considered operational and serves as the logistics guide for responding to animal disease–related emergencies in West Virginia. It supersedes all previous editions.

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

State Animal Health Official

Record of Changes

All changes to this Plan are to be dated on the master copy kept by West Virginia Department of Agriculture.

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| **Date Posted** | **Change** | **Recommending Agency/ Individual** |
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Record of Concurrence

When assistance is requested by West Virginia Department of Agriculture, the following agencies have concurred to provide the role of supporting the response to the State of West Virginia during an emergency where the IS 9 – Agriculture Incidents is activated.

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| **Support Agency** | **Authorized Representative** | **Date of Concurrence** |
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# Purpose

**Incident Specific Annex 9 – Agriculture Incidents**

**Appendix 8 – African Swine Fever/Classical Swine Fever**

The purpose of this appendix is to describe the unique concept of operations, and roles and responsibilities, of various agencies during an African Swine Fever (ASF) or Classical Swine Fever (CSF) response in the State of West Virginia (WV). This plan may be adapted to other animal disease outbreaks that require swift intervention by the West Virginia Department of Agriculture (WVDA) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) with support from other state and federal resources. This appendix complements the WV Incident Specific Annex 9 – Agriculture Incidents, by focusing on response aspects unique to an ASF or CSF response in WV.

# Scope

This appendix is intended to be scalable and, while focusing on ASF and CSF, may be used to describe the response to any high consequence livestock disease that requires an extraordinary response by WVDA. In the event of an outbreak of ASF or CSF, many additional resources will be required, and the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) may be activated. This appendix describes the concept of operations for the various response actions that would be required to mitigate and eradicate an ASF or CSF outbreak.

An outbreak of ASF or CSF will require a coordinated response from WVDA and USDA. Both agencies have limited staff and resources and will need to collaborate with local and state partners to respond in an effective and rapid manner. A border state with an ASF or CSF outbreak, or a state that imports or exports ASF or CSF susceptible animals, may also initiate a response in West Virginia due to producer and public concerns regarding herd vulnerability and keeping the state ASF or CSF free.

# Situation

An ASF or CSF outbreak has the potential to adversely affect livestock and wildlife, resulting in severe economic consequences for West Virginia. The impact of an ASF or CSF outbreak would directly affect farmers and producers, aligned agriculture-related industries, and consumers. Extraordinary response measures may be required to effectively control the spread of ASF or CSF, including quarantine, movement standstill, and animal depopulation and disposal measures. Response procedures are likely to extend across state lines and require a coordinated national response.

Unlike natural disasters, an animal disease event is initially identified by state or federal authorities. In addition, response authority is primarily held at the state or federal level. In the case of ASF or CSF a federal government response is likely required from the beginning. Through the Animal Health Protection Act, the US Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to provide federal funding for response and recovery actions in a ASF or CSF incident after official USDA laboratory testing and epidemiological information confirms the presence of ASF or CSF in the United States.

The US Department of Homeland Security has determined that the first confirmed positive index case of ASF or CSF in the nation is to be treated as a terrorism incident until proven otherwise. Such an incident will generate immediate and appropriate local, state, and federal measures to eliminate the crisis and minimize consequences.

# Planning Assumptions

1. Using ASF or CSF to attack or threaten an attack on the food supply would result in severe economic losses.
2. Since the United States has never had ASF, and has been free of CSF since 1978, the first case will be considered an act of terrorism. If this would happen, the Federal Bureau of Investigation will be the lead agency for the criminal investigation and WVDA would be the state’s lead agency for the ASF or CSF response.
3. Early detection is critical and encompasses a variety of response actions at all levels of government, industry, producers, and the private sector.
4. ASF or CSF mitigation and eradication may require the depopulation and disposal of large numbers of animals and invoke domestic and/or international trade restrictions.
5. ASF or CSF incidents do not respect jurisdictional boundaries and may require coordinated efforts between multiple local, tribal, state, regional, national, and international entities. An intentional act against agriculture would likely overwhelm the capabilities of any one entity, further enforcing the need for coordinated efforts.
6. Public-private partnerships are critical to mitigate the effects of an ASF or CSF outbreak.
7. A threat against the livestock community could initiate response actions at all levels of government and may result in generating panic among the public.
8. WVDA will enter into a Unified Command with USDA, with WVDA Executive Leadership approval, to allow for the most effective response.
9. Infected livestock premises, machinery, farms, and transport vehicles will need to be cleaned and/or disinfected.
10. An ASF or CSF outbreak has the potential to start in wildlife. Should such an outbreak occur, the West Virginia Department of Natural Resources (WV DNR) may be the initial lead agency. WVDA will conduct surveillance on domesticated livestock.

# Direction, Control, and Coordination

## Authority to Initiate Actions

This plan may be activated by the West Virginia Commissioner of Agriculture, or their designees, as outlined in West Virginia Code 19-9-2. An outbreak originating in feral swine or wild boar under WV DNR jurisdiction will require coordination between multiple state, federal, and industry stakeholders.

## Incident Command System

If WVDA Incident Management Team (IMT) activation is authorized by the WVDA Policy Group, Incident Command System (ICS) principles will be utilized, and an Incident Command Post(s) (ICP) will be fully activated as soon as possible to support response, mitigation, and recovery efforts. A Unified Command with USDA-Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)-Veterinary Services (VS) may be authorized and requested from the Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC).

State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) assistance may be requested by the WVDA Executive Leadership. The SEOC may have already been notified of an arising event by the WVDA Threat Preparedness Officer. If a ASF or CSF outbreak affects multiple regions of the state or widely separated premises, separate incident command posts may be established. A regional U.S. outbreak could lead to establishment and incorporation of WV responders into a large-scale Area Command response structure.

## Resource Request Process

The IMT will request state supporting agency resources through the WV Emergency Management Division (WVEMD) Answering Point Number. County Emergency Management or the IMT may request resources through WVEMD; requests will be approved through the WVDA IMT. Contact information for the Logistics Section will be posted on Emergency Management Information System to enable direct resource requests from County Emergency Management, supporting state agencies, and non-governmental animal industry stakeholders.

With WVDA Executive Leadership approval, the State Veterinarianor WVDA IMT will request from APHIS-VS federal assistance via Unified Command deployment of APHIS-VS personnel (indemnity appraisers, EMRS specialists, epidemiologists, etc.) into WV, National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) resources, APHIS-VS 3-D (depopulation/disposal/disinfection) contractors, and stockpile vaccine if available.

# Concept of Operations

## Partial Activation

While this appendix is written to address ASF or CSF in West Virginia, WVDA may activate one or more sections, either in whole or in part, of the appendix if ASF or CSF is in North America.

### African Swine Fever or Classical Swine Fever in North America

If an ASF or CSF outbreak should occur in North American outside of the continental United States or in the Caribbean Islands, WVDA may heighten their monitoring of ASF or CSF in those nations while informing the WVDA Commissioner of Agriculture and other state supporting agencies as to the response activities in those countries.

### African Swine Fever or Classical Swine Fever in the Western United States

If an ASF or CSF outbreak should occur in the Western United States (west of the Mississippi River), WVDA, in addition to the activities outlined in the previous section, may issue a movement standstill order, conduct epidemiological tracing, and may implement passive or active surveillance. WVDA IMT members, Industry Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MAC) members, and the Governor of West Virginia may be briefed on the situation. WVDA may also communicate with WVEMD about the availability of the SEOC. The Moorefield Animal Health Diagnostic Laboratory may support the outbreak by assisting with laboratory testing.

### African Swine Fever or Classical Swine Fever in the Eastern United States

If an ASF or CSF outbreak should occur in the Eastern United States (east of the Mississippi River), not in a border state, WVDA, in addition to the activities outlined in the previous sections, may activate the IMT and the Industry MAC. WVDA may brief the Governor of West Virginia, WVDA Policy Group and other state supporting agencies about the outbreak. WVDA may coordinate messaging with the Southern Agriculture and Animal Disaster Response Alliance (SAADRA and the Southern Animal Health Association (SAHA). The Moorefield Animal Health Diagnostic Laboratory may communicate with the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) reference laboratories.

### African Swine Fever or Classical Swine Fever in a Border State

If an ASF or CSF outbreak should occur in a border state, WVDA, in addition to the activities outlined in the previous sections, may conduct surveillance activities and assess animal movements into and out of West Virginia. WVDA may conduct epidemiological tracing and implement passive and/or active surveillance. WVDA may also activate the Joint Information Center (JIC) to conduct outreach communications and messaging to the animal industry and the public.

## General

Responding to an ASF or CSF outbreak is within the statutory authority and mandate of WVDA as outlined in West Virginia Code 19-9-2.

As the lead agency, WVDA, under the direction of the Commissioner of Agriculture and in partnership with the USDA, will direct all animal disease investigation, surveillance, movement standstill, diagnostic, biosecurity, animal depopulation, vaccination, carcass disposal, cleaning and disinfection, and recovery activities. This coordination will be implemented through a Unified Command.

The primary and support agencies will coordinate through WVEMD and county Emergency Operations Centers (EOC). An ICP will likely be established at one of four locations – Pilgrims/Bean Building, 206 Railroad Street, Moorefield, WV; WV State Fairgrounds, 891 Maplewood Avenue, Fairlea (Lewisburg), WV; WVDA Guthrie Complex, 217 Douglass Lane, Charleston, WV; or WVDA Morgantown Office, 270 Mylan Park Drive, Morgantown, WV – to ensure the most effective response and use of personnel and equipment. Technical experts may also be co-located with the Incident Management Team at the ICP to ensure enhanced coordination. If any of the above four ICP locations are not useable, alternative venues will be determined as needed to establish a fully functional ICP, including potential multiple ICPs may be needed as indicated in the base Incident Support Annex.

As described in the base Incident Support Annex, the key elements of a response to an ASF or CSF incident include the following: incident identification; incident management; communication and coordination; assessment, control, and containment; and recovery.

Additional information on the VS ASF or CSF response strategy may be found in the current version of the ASF Red Book[[1]](#footnote-1) or CSF Red Book[[2]](#footnote-2) .

## Incident Identification

Incident identification for ASF or CSF would follow the steps mentioned in Incident Specific Annex 9.

## Incident Management

Incident management for an ASF or CSF response would follow the steps and structures mentioned in Incident Specific Annex 9.

### Information Management

The response goal is to have VS Emergency Management Response System (EMRS) information downloads or data entry processes performed in 24-hour or shorter intervals. EMRS is the official system of record for information in an ASF or CSF outbreak. In addition, information management includes systems and procedures for sharing information with and from industry to be coordinated by WVDA Information Technology Division.

## Assessment, Control, and Containment

### Diagnosis

Most veterinary practitioners and livestock production personnel have limited experience in the clinical diagnosis of ASF or CSF. Discovery of a suspect case requires immediate notification to the West Virginia State Veterinarian or USDA for sample collection and expedited transportation to the National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) – Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostics Laboratory (FADDL). A suspect case, where an animal shows clinical signs that appear consistent with ASF or CSF, requires strict reporting and monitoring measures to be implemented. An outbreak originating in feral swine or wild boar under WV DNR jurisdiction will require coordination between multiple state, federal, and industry stakeholders. WVDA or USDA will deploy a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) to the site soon after the initial report from a local veterinarian is received. A FAD investigation, including required laboratory testing, will be conducted in an accelerated manner based on observations of the FADD. Duplicate samples will be collected by the FADD. One set of samples will be submitted to FADDL and one set will be submitted to an approved NAHLN laboratory.

WVDA may initiate some level of response based upon a NAHLN laboratory result of presumptive non-negative for ASF or CSF. In this case, WVDA would not make any public information releases until USDA has confirmed the non-negative and made the initial announcement; however, WVDA may begin mitigation activities and response planning, pending confirmation by FADDL.

WVDA also may initiate a FAD investigation of suspect animals in West Virginia that came from another state (trace). During these trace investigations, WVDA may deploy a FADD to the site soon after receiving information about the trace.

As part of the investigation, the FADD will determine the likelihood of ASF or CSF. Their determination will help classify the case as “low suspicion,” “intermediate suspicion,” or “high suspicion.” The FADD will quarantine the suspect site (domestic swine) or establish an infected zone (feral swine) until laboratory results rule out ASF or CSF.

When a case is classified as “high suspicion,” the FADD will notify and consult with the West Virginia State Veterinarian and the USDA AVIC. Samples will be submitted to an approved NAHLN laboratory and FADDL as “Priority 1” to guarantee that a presumptive diagnosis is achieved within 24 hours.

### Notification

Based on consultation between the FADD, West Virginia State Veterinarian, and the USDA AVIC, the following response and notification measures may be taken:

1. A quarantine will be placed on the premise, and the premise will be defined as an infected premise.
2. An infected zone will be established if detected in feral swine. The minimum infected zone is 3 square km (1.86 miles) around the dead pig.
3. The West Virginia State Veterinarian will notify the WVDA Executive Team and WVDA Emergency Preparedness Supervisor.
4. The Commissioner of Agriculture will notify the Governor of West Virginia.
5. The WVDA Emergency Preparedness Supervisor will notify the WVEMD as indicated in the WVDA IMT Activation/Notification procedure utilizing the WVEMD Answering Point Number.
6. Any additional notification procedures will be implemented as written in the WVDA Notification SOG.

WVEMD may activate the SEOC to the level required by the incident and assist by coordinating response activities with local emergency management in support of WVDA. The Governor may declare a State of Emergency. Under a State of Emergency, WVEMD may direct state supporting agencies to assist under the policies of the WV Emergency Operations Plan. The USDA APHIS ASF and CSF Response Plans (The Red Books), describe the details and processes for a U.S Secretary of Agriculture to issue an extraordinary emergency declaration for an ASF or CSF event. Further federal response information is provided in the current version of the ASF Red Book[[3]](#footnote-3) or CSF Red Book[[4]](#footnote-4).

Notification of state associations representing the potentially impacted species may occur with the understanding these communications would be private and the state associations would be asked to refrain from any public announcements. This pre-confirmation notification will allow the associations to prepare their response.

## Quarantine

West Virginia Code provides the Commissioner of Agriculture or designees the authority to quarantine suspect or infected premises. In the case of a suspect ASF or CSF diagnosis, the potentially infected operation will be quarantined. The quarantine will request limited personnel, vehicle, and equipment movement on and off site and will provide suggestions for proper cleaning and disinfection of personnel, vehicles, and equipment. For ASF or CSF, additional quarantines may be imposed on adjacent operations or other dangerous contact operations.

The Incident Commander, Disease Surveillance Branch (Operations Section), and Situation Unit (Planning Section), should coordinate to establish an infected zone (IZ) and a buffer zone (BZ) within 12 hours of the identification of an index case. Controlled movement orders and 24-hour standstill notices are likely to be implemented upon detection of ASF or CSF in the United States in relevant regions or zones. Once the control area (CA) (IZ plus BZ) is established, quarantine and movement controls will be implemented.

In addition, WVDA may close livestock markets and other livestock events throughout the state as well as likely place restrictions on hunting preserves and other premises with swine.

## Epidemiology and Tracing

Epidemiology and tracing play an important role in identifying the spread of ASF or CSF. Tracing may include identifying the movements of livestock, animal products, vehicles, feedstuffs, and other vectors. For ASF or CSF, tracing will generally go back two incubation periods defined by the OIE, which is 30 days total for ASF and 28 days for CSF or as defined by APHIS-VS.

Epidemiology and tracing may include the surveillance of livestock, the investigation of reported suspect animals, and testing. Surveillance activities will be led by the assessments and data analysis conducted by the epidemiologist involved in supporting a Unified Command. The *Epidemiological Investigation and Tracing SOP[[5]](#footnote-5)* as well as the *NAHEMS*

*Guidelines: Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing[[6]](#footnote-6)* both provide more

information.

## Movement Standstill

The USDA-APHIS-VS will likely issue a 72-hour movement standstill order in the event of an ASF or CSF outbreak and request states to support it with their quarantine authority. The state movement standstill order will provide details regarding what can and cannot move. In addition, the state movement standstill order will prescribe penalties for violations of the order. West Virginia law enforcement officers may be asked to enforce the movement standstill order throughout the state of West Virginia. The intent of the movement standstill order is to contain the spread of disease.

The USDA Veterinary Services Deputy Administrator and Chief Veterinary Officer may request states to support a national standstill order upon confirmation of ASF or CSF in the continental United States. The West Virginia State Veterinarian will conduct a risk assessment to determine the risk posed to WV agriculture and, based on this assessment and discussion with the WVDA Policy Group and WVDA IMT, will decide whether to support the national standstill.

In the event WVDA supports the implementation of movement standstill, livestock haulers and others affected by the order will be given a grace period to either return to their point of origin or continue to their destination. This grace period will be determined by a risk assessment.

If a movement standstill order is issued, a designated starting time will be listed, as well as an anticipated ending time. Just before the ending time, the need for continuing the order will be assessed and could be extended. The order will be in effect until revoked or revised by the State Veterinarian or WVDA IMT/Unified Command. To move prohibited animals, commodities, or equipment during a stop order, a permit will be necessary. If any special movements are allowed during the 72-hour national standstill, a permit will be issued from WVDA. Permits will be granted only for necessary movements exhibiting little or no risk of disease spread. Transport vehicles hauling livestock must have a valid permit, and information regarding permits will be shared with law enforcement.

## Depopulation

Depopulation is one mechanism used to mitigate ASF or CSF. Animals destined for depopulation will be humanely treated from the time they are identified for depopulation until the time they are depopulated. Depopulation must be performed as rapidly and humanely as possible. Depopulation will follow the American Veterinary Medical Association’s guidelines. Depopulation of susceptible wildlife will be assessed and may be encompassed in the response efforts for an ASF or CSF outbreak.

Animals identified for depopulation will need to be appraised for value prior to depopulation if indemnity is to be requested*.*

## Disposal

Eradication of ASF or CSF will require proper disposal procedures for carcasses. USDA has published technical guidance on their [Carcass Management Dashboard](https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/emergency-management/carcass-management/carcass). The website guides the user through carcass management options for planning or response purposes.

WVDA, WVDEP, USDA-Natural Resources Conservation Services (NRCS), and USDA-APHIS will determine which option for carcass disposal will be chosen. Rendering, composting, landfilling, burial, and incineration are all options for disposal in West Virginia.

Determining the feasibility of using burial or composting will be based on several factors. Burial sites are limited in the state according to the USDA-NRCS Web Soil Survey. Utmost care will be taken to prevent the creation of human, animal, and environmental hazards. Consideration must also be given to long-term care of the disposal area.

Manure and bedding from ASF or CSF infected animals will be disposed of based on the guidance from appropriate state and federal authorities. Manure and bedding from animals not infected with ASF or CSF may also have to be disposed of until movement standstill restrictions are lifted or adjusted to allow for product and waste movement off the farm.

## Biosecurity

Procedures to prevent ASF or CSF spread will be implemented immediately on suspicion of ASF or CSF. Enhanced biosecurity measures will be enacted by responders and producers for any areas under suspicion for the outbreak.Responders will observe proper biosecurity protocols and direct producers and visitors to follow appropriate procedures. The biosecurity requirements will be operation-specific and set by the Unified Command. Guidance for biosecurity will be based off the USDA APHIS ASF and CSF Response Plans (The Red Books): *Biosecurity,* Chapters 4.11[[7]](#footnote-7) and 5.9[[8]](#footnote-8).

## Surveillance

### Premises Surveillance

The objectives of surveillance activities are to:

1. Detect infected premises during an ASF or CSF outbreak.
2. Determine the extent of an ASF or CSF outbreak.
3. Supply information to evaluate ASF or CSF outbreak control activities.
4. Provide information for animal and product movement within the control area.
5. Provide information for animal and product movement out of the control area.
6. Prove disease freedom status and regain disease-free status after the eradication of the outbreak.

Surveillance within the control area will initially be performed by visual inspection of susceptible species. Surveillance of premises within the control area will include laboratory testing of susceptible animals.

Surveillance within the surveillance zone will include visual inspection of susceptible species, slaughter surveillance, serological surveys, and investigation of reports of suspect disease. It will include livestock facilities and susceptible wildlife populations if present. The level and direction of surveillance will be driven by epidemiological information being collected.

Surveillance outside the quarantine area will be accomplished by visual inspection of susceptible species, slaughter surveillance, serological surveys, and investigation of reports of suspect disease.

Surveillance during an ASF or CSF outbreak will be coordinated to optimize available resources. VS will coordinate national surveillance activities from national or regional operational centers. WVDA will manage state surveillance activities from the ICP. Survey teams and sampling teams will be dispatched out of the Operations Section. WVEMD will manage state agency resources and coordination at the SEOC. On-site coordination will be led by the FADD or other appropriate officials. County EOCs will provide support to local operations and will provide information to the SEOC and the WVDA ICP.

Intervals between surveillance inspections will depend on the incubation period of ASF or CSF, available resources, and risk of exposure to susceptible animals.

Suspect premises without reported clinical illness should be inspected at least three times during each incubation period. Every effort must be made to educate producers about clinical signs and to report symptoms consistent with disease presentation.

A surveillance plan for feral swine and wild boar will be developed and implemented to determine if the agent is in that population.

Further information may be found in the current version of the USDA APHIS ASF and CSF Response Plans (The Red Books): *Surveillance* Chapters 4.4[[9]](#footnote-9) and 5.3[[10]](#footnote-10).

Figure 1. Example of Zones and Areas in an ASF or CSF Outbreak

### Wildlife Surveillance

Immediately upon establishing a quarantine area(s), a surveillance program will be implemented to detect the presence of ASF or CSF in feral swine and wild boar within and outside of the quarantine area. Surveillance may be passive, examining animals killed on roads or from hunting; or it can be active, relying on wildlife personnel selectively taking live animals for surveillance purposes. If feral swine and wild boar populations are determined to be positive for ASF or CSF, wildlife management principles will be used to prevent exposure to livestock.

Assessment of the risks posed by wild animals will require information:

1. Density and distribution
2. Habitat
3. Contact risks with livestock
4. Length of time wildlife could have been exposed to ASF or CSF

Information collected will impact the measures required for containment, surveillance, and depopulation of feral swine and wild boar.

## Vaccination

Vaccination during a ASF or CSF outbreak may become a viable option for disease containment. The use of ASF or CSF vaccine may have international trade implications. The application of ASF or CSF vaccination is controlled by USDA. If USDA approves the use of ASF or CSF vaccine to control ASF or CSF in the United States, vaccine could be requested by WVDA if the Unified Command determines the ASF or CSF outbreak cannot be contained by quarantine and depopulation alone. Application of vaccine will be based on a risk assessment. Once vaccinated, these animals would form a barrier to slow the spread of ASF or CSF. Vaccinated animals may have to be slaughtered through normal slaughter channels after the outbreak is contained, to return the country to a more favorable trade status.

Vaccine could be requested from the NVS, by the West Virginia State Veterinarian or WVDA IMT. Acquisition of ASF or CSF vaccine would require WVDA to provide proper security for the vaccine, provide qualified staff to implement vaccinations on-site, and track vaccinates through their lifespan. In the case of ASF or CSF, depending on the species being vaccinated, periodic follow-up vaccinations may be necessary to maintain protection.

By preventing infection through vaccination, issues associated with depopulation of large numbers of livestock are avoided and meat is preserved for human consumption.

To date there is no vaccine available for ASF. Additional information regarding CSF vaccines may be found in the current version of the USDA APHIS CSF Response Plan: The Red Book, Chapter 5.16, *Vaccination[[11]](#footnote-11).*

## Cleaning and Disinfection

All premises with infected animals or animals that have been depopulated will be required to be cleaned and disinfected. Cleaning and disinfection is essential to contain the spread of ASF or CSF and is an integral part of the eradication process. Care should be taken to reduce the production and dispersal of infectious dust and aerosols. If items cannot be appropriately cleaned and disinfected, they will be properly disposed.

Any premise or item identified as contaminated will be cleaned and disinfected as soon as possible. Specific guidelines for cleaning and disinfection during an ASF or CSF outbreak can be found in the USDA APHIS ASF and CSF Response Plans (The Red Books): *Cleaning and Disinfection,* Chapters 4.12.3[[12]](#footnote-12) and 5.15[[13]](#footnote-13).

All cleaning and disinfection related to an ASF or CSF response will be coordinated with WVDEP to minimize environmental impact, while assuring proper virus deactivation.

## Appraisal and Indemnity

During an ASF or CSF response, indemnity and appraisal becomes a function of USDA. At the time this plan was developed, *appraisals will not be required to be signed prior to destruction if APHIS and the cooperating State agree that the livestock must be destroyed immediately to mitigate the potential spread or amplification of* ASF or CSF *during a response to a confirmed or presumptive* ASF or CSF *incident. In this case, APHIS will require that the livestock owner/producer sign an appraisal and indemnity request form, which captures basic information and confirms that the producer will accept fair market value for depopulated animals.*

9 C.F.R 53.3, 53.8 and 53.10 address compensation for items that cannot be decontaminated and may later have to be destroyed.

Federal statutes allow for fair market value compensation for animals and carcasses as well as products and items that were destroyed to effectively control or eradicate ASF or CSF. Federal law also allows for compensation of materials and products contaminated during the outbreak.

## Recovery

Surveillance after an outbreak should be carefully coordinated to optimize available resources. Many factors such as potential spread by feral swine and wild boar; feed and other contaminated materials, could warrant increased surveillance in some areas. Intervals between inspections may depend on the incubation period, available resources, and exposure risk. In addition, efforts must be made to educate producers about clinical signs of ASF or CSF and the importance of reporting information to veterinarians.

Surveillance within an area will occur primarily through livestock inspection and the placement of sentinel herds at depopulated premises. Surveillance may involve slaughter surveillance, serological surveys, and investigations of ASF or CSF. Surveillance during the recovery phase is conducted to ensure recognition of disease-free status, repopulation of livestock, and release of quarantine.

WVDA, in coordination with USDA, will determine when or how infected premises will be allowed to repopulate.

Other objectives that will be considered in the recovery phase include:

1. Releasing premises quarantines
2. Determining the length of restrictive covenant (when land is used for burial) imposed by WVDEP and NRCS.
3. Phasing out indemnity.
4. Tracking and reporting agency response costs.
5. Assessing economic loss to businesses directly and indirectly impacted.
6. Identifying and facilitating recovery assistance and programs.
7. Coordinating social services/mental health.
8. Identifying recovery funding gaps (e.g., what might be provided through the Farm Service Agency).
9. Continuing necessary inter/intra agency communications.
10. Continuing with virus elimination activities on infected premises.
11. Supporting sustained operations until eradication is complete.
12. Identifying wildlife concerns with protection/containment/restoration/euthanasia.

# Responsibilities

Most state and federal agencies have emergency functions in addition to their normal, day-to-day activities. Each agency is responsible for developing and maintaining its own emergency management procedures. This section lists WVDA and USDA roles and responsibilities as they relate to a ASF or CSF incident.

The role of state agencies supporting local government in most emergency response operations changes during an ASF or CSF incident. State supporting agencies’ tasks are defined in the Incident Specific Annex #9 – *Agriculture Incidents* unless enumerated in other annexes and/or appendices. West Virginia law authorizes the West Virginia State Veterinarian to take extraordinary measures to minimize the impact of ASF or CSF. WVDA will direct all response measures including those at the local level. The West Virginia State Veterinarian or the Acting State Veterinarian will serve as the de facto Incident Commander and point-of-contact with USDA APHIS at the outset of a ASF or CSF outbreak in North America, until such time the WVDA IMT is operational and Unified Command potentials are communicated with USDA APHIS, which may also include discussions of NVS assets; ASF or CSF vaccines; depopulation, disposal, and disinfection (3D) contractors; and other elemental issues likely for ASF or CSF response in the United States. The WVDA Incident Commander will have the authority to make necessary changes to the Incident Command structure to adjust to ever-changing situations.

### West Virginia Commissioner of Agriculture

1. Serves as the WVDA administrator and policy leader.
2. Notifies and maintains communications with the WV Office of the Governor. WVEMD notification will be by the designated WVDA Threat Preparedness/Response Officer or their designee.
3. Utilizes the applicable WVDA IMT Activation/Notification/Feedback procedure.
4. Performs the duties outlined in West Virginia Code 19-9-2, *Duties and Powers of Commissioner*.

### West Virginia State Veterinarian and WVDA Animal Health Division

1. Directs ASF or CSF surveillance and investigations early in an outbreak event prior to IMT activation and establishment of a fully functioning ICP.
2. Coordinates with supporting agencies.
3. Coordinates and advises applicable producers, livestock markets, trade groups, and other relevant organizations.
4. Notifies WVDA Threat Preparedness/Response Officer.
5. Establishes quarantine areas early in an outbreak event, before IMT is activated, a fully functioning ICP is established, and Unified Command is in place including epidemiologist.
6. Notifies WVDA Threat Preparedness/Response Officer and coordinates WVDA IMT Activation/Notification/Feedback procedures.
7. Proposes a Unified Command with USDA-APHIS-VS.
8. Issues movement standstill order to support a USDA national movement standstill.
9. Coordinates with the National Veterinary Stockpile early in an outbreak event, before IMT is activated and fully functioning ICP is established.
10. Requests activation of SEOC, if appropriate.
11. Reports suspicion of animal disease at state-inspected slaughter plants to the West Virginia State Veterinarian.
12. Assists slaughter plant owners with implementing biosecurity measures.
13. Provides personnel to support the response.

### WVDA Incident Management Team

1. Activates when requested.
2. Publishes Situation Reports and Incident Action Plans on a regular basis.
3. Invites WVEMD to send a liaison, or sends WVDA liaison, to the State EOC, depending on the event.
4. Sets up and staffs task forces and strike teams as determined by incident objectives.
5. Identifies and publishes traffic control points.
6. Directs cleaning and disinfection.
7. Directs indemnity and appraisal efforts in conjunction with USDA APHIS.
8. Directs depopulation and disposal.
9. Conducts epidemiological investigations.
10. Conducts surveillance.
11. Ensures appropriate training and orientation of responders.

### WVDA Regulatory and Environmental Affairs Division

1. Determines risk for Grade A dairies with mixed livestock populations related to movement of potentially contaminated materials, vehicles, manure, and carcass disposal options.
2. Issues movement restrictions for contaminated materials, vehicles, manure, and carcass disposal options.
3. Educates dairy producers on biosecurity and movement restrictions.
4. Coordinates with milk cooperatives, haulers, and processors.

### Moorefield Animal Health Diagnostic Laboratory

1. Receives and accessions samples from ASF or CSF investigations.
2. Provides analytical testing of animal samples for ASF or CSF with NAHLN testing protocols.
3. Coordinates information and data sharing.
4. Provides timely reports of laboratory results, including via NAHLN-messaging.
5. Maintains chain-of-custody and forwards samples as needed.
6. Provides sample collection tools, equipment, and guidance to field investigators.

## Federal Agencies

### United States Department of Agriculture

At the federal level, USDA has overall responsibility to coordinate national surveillance and preparedness activities, and implement eradication measures, in close coordination with state and local governments. USDA provides several critical services and functions through multiple areas of expertise as discussed below.

### USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

USDA APHIS has broad authorities under a Secretary's Emergency Declaration and a Secretary's Extraordinary Emergency Declaration. In an ASF or CSF outbreak, response efforts will be supported by other federal agencies under the National Response Framework (NRF). USDA APHIS, in partnership with WVDA, is responsible for:

1. Consulting with local authorities regarding eradication activities including quarantine, evaluation, euthanasia, disposal, cleaning and disinfecting, epidemiological investigation, vector control, and permitting systems.
2. Collection, analysis, and dissemination of technical and logistical information.
3. Issuing disease declarations and defining the infected area and control areas.
4. Preparing information for dissemination to the public, media, producers, processors, and transportation industry.
5. Funding for compensation, if available, to owners of depopulated animals as designated by the Secretary of Agriculture.
6. Restricting payment of compensation in cases of violation.
7. Posting restrictions on interstate commerce.
8. Entering into a Unified Command with WVDA.
9. Assisting with control and containment of ASF or CSF in wildlife populations.

# Authorities

## West Virginia

West Virginia Code 19-9, *Diseases Among Domestic Animals*, outlines the authorities related to responding to diseases among domestic animals.

## Federal

The United States Code of Federal Regulations, Title 9 – Animal and Animal Products, Chapter I – Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Department of Agriculture, Subchapter B – Cooperative Control and Eradication of Livestock or Poultry Diseases, Part 53 – Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Pleuropneumonia, Rinderpest, and Certain Other Communicable Diseases of Livestock or Poultry (9 CFR Part 53) outlines the authorities related to responding to diseases among domestic livestock and poultry.

1. <https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/asf-responseplan.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. <https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/csf_responseplan.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/asf-responseplan.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. <https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/csf_responseplan.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. <https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/Generic_EpiTracing_February2014_FINAL_v3.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. <https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/nahems_guidelines/nahems_sur_epi_trac.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. <https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/asf-responseplan.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. <https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/csf_responseplan.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. <https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/asf-responseplan.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. <https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/csf_responseplan.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. <https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/csf_responseplan.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. <https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/asf-responseplan.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. <https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/csf_responseplan.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-13)